84

A Difference that Makes a Difference: Welfare
and the Equality of Consideration
Elijah Weber
Philosophy Department
Bowling Green State University
eliweber1980@gmail.com

Abstract
In Welfare, Happiness, and Ethics, L.W. Sumner defends two significant
constraints on one’s theory of welfare: formality and generality. An adequate
theory of welfare, claims Sumner, must give a constitutive account of the “good-for”
relation. This constitutive account must be sufficiently general that any entity
whose status as a welfare subject is uncontroversial falls within its scope. This
paper will argue that Sumner’s proposed constraints are particularly significant to
utilitarian arguments for the equal moral considerability of non-human animals.
In the absence of these constraints, the inconsistency that is alleged to follow from
denying moral considerability to non-human animals, while affirming it for
humans, fails to obtain. I will focus on Peter Singer’s argument for the equal moral
considerability of non-human animals, in order to support the conclusion that
questions about the formality and generality of welfare are significant areas of
further research for philosophers of animal welfare.

Introduction: Welfare and Animal Ethics
Welfare is about how well an individual is faring, relative to the
circumstances of their life. Well-being and prudential value are both
synonymous with welfare, such that talk about an individual’s wellbeing, or the prudential value of some aspect of their lives, is taken to
be about their welfare. There are many different accounts of what
welfare is, but all largely agree that welfare concerns how individuals
are faring, and that welfare matters for ethics. Thus, questions about
animal welfare are properly questions about how non-human animals
are faring, and what sorts of things would make their lives better for
them.
In Welfare, Happiness, and Ethics, L.W. Sumner proposes two
requirements for an adequate theory of welfare. One of these is the
requirement of generality. This requirement states that an adequate
theory of welfare should accommodate the wide variety of types of
welfare subjects to which our welfare vocabulary is applied (Sumner
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1996, 14). This is a controversial suggestion, since we speak similarly
about the well-being of other humans, non-human mammals,
mollusks, houseplants, and even automobiles. Sumner claims that
this controversy can be addressed by distinguishing between the core
welfare subjects and the periphery. Whereas there is bound to be
disagreement about whether fringe entities are truly welfare subjects,
an adequate theory of welfare would have to at least account for
beings about which there is no such disagreement (Sumner 1996, 15).
Another requirement proposed by Sumner is the requirement of
formality. Sumner’s proposal here is that a theory of welfare must do
more than simply offer a list of the sources of welfare. Rather, a
theory of welfare must provide a constitutive account of the good-for
relation (Sumner 1996, 17). While adequate food, access to clean
water, affordable medical care, and a decent education might all be
important for a person’s well-being, this doesn’t explain why all of
these things belong on this list. A theory of welfare must explain
what is common to the variety of sources of welfare, even across
species lines, which qualify them as sources of welfare. Sumner notes
that this amounts to a “unitary theory of welfare,” whereby the goodfor relation is taken to hold across relata (Sumner 1996, 17). In what
follows, I will also refer to Sumner’s formality requirement by
reference to the notion that welfare is unitary.
The formality and generality of welfare are proposed by
Sumner as constraints that are intended to guide inquiry into the
nature of welfare, but these requirements have also played a
prominent role in utilitarian arguments for the equal moral
considerability of non-human animals. Peter Singer, Bernard Rollin,
and R.G. Frey are among the proponents of such arguments (Singer
1975, Rollin 2006, Frey 1983). Though Rollin and Frey disagree with
Singer on a number of key points, they all agree that there is a
fundamental inconsistency in denying moral considerability to nonhuman animals while granting it to human beings. Their arguments
have been successful because they highlight something that seems
obvious, but is often taken for granted in our daily lives. If humans
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fare better to the extent that their pain is minimized and their
pleasure is maximized, why think non-human animals are any
different? Perhaps the most successful of these types of arguments is
Peter Singer’s argument that denying equal moral considerability to
non-human animals is a form of prejudice that he dubs
“speciesism” (Singer 1975). Singer’s argument contends that it is the
capacity for suffering which is the sufficient condition for having
interests, and that all beings that have interests are due equal moral
consideration (Singer 1975, 2-9). Since non-human animals have the
capacity for suffering, non-human animals are therefore due the
same moral consideration that humans receive. It is only in virtue of
species-specific prejudice that humans neglect to extend due moral
consideration to non-human animals. Singer rightly concludes that
speciesism, like racism and sexism, are unjustifiable forms of
discrimination.
Singer’s argument, though compelling, rests on two assumptions
that reflect Sumner’s constraints: that welfare is a unitary concept
and that a theory of welfare must be general. Singer’s argument
assumes that welfare amounts to the same thing for humans and non
-human animals. This paper will first explain the role that these two
assumptions play in Singer’s argument, and then demonstrate that
the inconsistency that is alleged to follow from denying the moral
considerability of non-human animals is avoidable if one either
rejects the generality requirement or denies that welfare is unitary.
Both of Sumner’s requirements may be appropriate constraints on a
theory of welfare, but in the absence of convincing arguments to this
effect, they are nothing more than undefended assumptions that are
crucial to the success of utilitarian arguments for the equal moral
considerability of non-human animals. These considerations thus
represent an important area for further philosophical research on
welfare in general, and animal welfare in particular.

Welfare and the Moral Considerability of Humans
In Animal Liberation, Peter Singer offers a utilitarian
argument for the equal moral considerability of non-human animals
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(Singer 1975, 2-9). It is important to specify the sense in which this
argument is a utilitarian one. After all, Singer is not here advocating
that the morally best action is the one which leads to the greatest
aggregate amount of happiness (though Singer sometimes speaks this
way about both human and animal welfare). Rather, Singer’s
argument for the moral considerability of non-human animals
emphasizes the utilitarian commitment to the unique moral
significance of welfare (Sumner 1996, 186). Singer’s argument,
though he utilizes the language of pleasures, pains, and interests, is
properly an argument from the moral significance of welfare. The
form of Singer’s argument from Animal Liberation, as applied to the
human case, is the following:
1. If humans can experience pleasure and pain, then humans have
interests.
2. Humans can experience pleasure and pain.
3. Therefore, humans have interests.
4. If humans have interests, then humans are due moral
consideration.
5. Therefore, humans are due moral consideration(Singer 1975, 5-8).
Singer concludes that it would be inconsistent to accept this
argument but reject the same argument concerning non-human
animals. But before we assess this claim, let’s consider whether this
argument is sound as it stands.
The above formulation of Singer’s argument suggests that being
able to experience pleasure and pain is a sufficient condition for
having interests, and that having interests is sufficient for moral
considerability. But why think the fourth premise, that having
interests is sufficient for being morally considerable, is true?
Depending on how we formulate the notion of having an interest,
entities that are not obviously morally considerably might qualify as
having interests. For example, if organisms have an interest in
whatever keeps them alive, then plants have interests. Corporations
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clearly have interests, but they are not obviously due equal moral
consideration in virtue of this.
The first premise might be thought to eliminate this possibility,
since plants and corporations lack the capacity for pleasure and pain.
But the first premise is a conditional statement establishing pleasure
and pain as a sufficient condition for having interests. It is perfectly
consistent to accept the first premise while rejecting the fourth, on
the grounds that while the capacity for pleasure and pain is sufficient
for having interests, having interests is not sufficient for moral
considerability. The worry here is simply that we need some reason
to think that having interests is sufficient for being morally
considerable, both generally and because some entities that have
interests do not seem to be morally considerable.
This concern can be avoided by revealing an implicit premise
which connects having interests to being a welfare subject, and then
inferring moral considerability from the fact that one is a welfare
subject. Such a strategy is consistent with the utilitarian commitment
to welfare as the sole source of intrinsic value. The modified version
of Singer’s argument is as follows:
1a. If humans can experience pleasure and pain, then humans have
interests.
2a. Humans can experience pleasure and pain.
3a. Therefore, humans have interests.
4a. If humans have interests, then humans are welfare subjects.
5a. Therefore, humans are welfare subjects.
6a. If humans are welfare subjects, then humans are due moral
consideration.
7a. Therefore humans are due moral consideration.
This argument commits Singer to the satisfaction of interests as a
constituent of the good-for, since it makes having interests sufficient
for being a welfare subject. However, it does not commit him to an
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interest-satisfaction theory of welfare, wherein the good-for relation
is specified solely in terms of the satisfaction of a subject’s interests.
In the next section, I will argue that Singer’s commitment to the
claim that it would be inconsistent to affirm the moral considerability
of human beings while denying equal moral consideration to nonhuman animals does commit him to a unitary theory of welfare,
where interest-satisfaction is a constituent of the good-for relation
for both humans and non-human animals.

Inferring the Moral Considerability of Non-Human
Animals
So far, I have argued that in order to infer the moral
considerability of humans from the fact that they have interests,
Singer must appeal to interest-satisfaction as a constituent of welfare.
Next, I will present Singer’s argument for the moral considerability of
non-human animals and demonstrate the role of the formality and
generality of welfare in arguments of this sort. Below is Singer’s
argument for the moral considerability of non-human animals, along
with my proposed amendment revealing Singer’s implicit premise.
1b. If non-human animals can experience pleasure and pain, then
non-human animals have interests.
2b. Non-human animals can experience pleasure and pain.
3b. Therefore, non-human animals have interests.
4b. If non-human animals have interests, then non-human animals
are welfare subjects.
5b. Therefore, non-human animals are welfare subjects.
6b. If non-human animals are welfare subjects, then non-human
animals are due moral consideration.
7b. Therefore, non-human animals are due moral consideration.
As in the human case, moral considerability follows from being a
welfare subject, rather than simply having interests or being capable
of pleasure and pain. And like the argument for the moral
considerability of humans, this argument also depends on interest-
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satisfaction being constitutive of the good-for relation, whether
partially or completely. It is tempting to think that interests need
only be partially constitutive of the good-for relation for Singer’s
argument to be sound in both cases, and that the additional
constituents of welfare can differ according to subject type. By
considering the general form of Singer’s argument, it becomes clear
why this is not the case.
1c. If X can experience pleasure and pain, then X has interests.
2c. X can experience pleasure and pain.
3c. Therefore, X has interests.
4c. If X has interests, then X is a welfare subject.
5c. Therefore, X is a welfare subject.
6c. If X is a welfare subject, then X is due moral consideration.
7c. Therefore, X is due moral consideration.
For this to be a valid argument, being a welfare subject must mean
the same thing whatever object is substituted for X. As I discussed in
the first section of this paper, being a welfare subject involves being
the sort of creature for whom things can go better or worse. If the
way in which things go better or worse for a human being is
constitutively different from the way that things go better or worse
for non-human animals, then being a welfare subject does not mean
the same thing for both humans and non-human animals. Thus, for
the general form of Singer’s argument to be valid, welfare must be a
unitary concept. The good-for relation must be constitutively
identical, otherwise Singer’s argument equivocates on the term
“welfare.” Either the good-for relation must be specified solely in
terms of interest-satisfaction, or the additional constituents of the
good-for relation must be the same for humans and non-human
animals.
This is not a problem for Singer’s argument, but it is a necessary
concession for the form of his argument to be valid. If Singer defends
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a single account of the good-for relation that includes interestsatisfaction as a constituent, then both humans and non-human
animals qualify as welfare subjects in virtue of having interests,
because “welfare” refers to the same thing throughout Singer’s
argument. To deny the moral considerability of non-human animals
while affirming it for humans then would be inconsistent, because
non-human animals clearly meet the sufficient condition for being
welfare subjects, and therefore qualify for moral consideration. A
unitary theory of welfare does commit one to the conclusion that non
-human animals are due equal moral consideration, as Singer claims.
That this is a desirable outcome for one’s theory of welfare is
supported by Sumner’s generality requirement, which says that an
adequate theory of welfare must capture the core class of welfare
subjects within its scope.

Avoiding Inconsistency: Two Strategies
Despite the seemingly positive resolution of some initial
concerns with Singer’s argument, there is reason to think that his
argument remains susceptible to serious challenges. In this section, I
will offer two strategies for avoiding the inconsistency charge that
makes Singer’s argument so effective. The goal of this section is to
demonstrate that both the generality and formality requirements
proposed by Sumner are necessary for Singer’s inconsistency charges
to stick. In the absence of either requirement, one can easily explain
why there is no inconsistency in accepting the moral considerability
of human beings while failing to grant equal moral consideration to
non-human animals.
Solution #1: Reject the Generality Requirement
Suppose one were to accept the unity of welfare, but deny the
generality requirement, as well as denying that welfare is even
partially constituted by interest satisfaction. One might instead hold,
for example, that welfare is constituted by the satisfaction of a
subject’s desires (Sumner 1996, 113-137). This allows one to accept
Singer’s argument in the human case, but reject it in the animal case.
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To illustrate this, let’s examine both arguments, along with the truthvalue assignments that would reflect this position.
1d. If humans have desires that can be satisfied, humans are welfare
subjects. - T
2d. Humans have desires that can be satisfied. - T
3d. Therefore, humans are welfare subjects. - T
4d. If humans are welfare subjects, then humans are due moral
consideration. - T
5d. Therefore, humans are due moral consideration. - T

1b. If non-human animals can experience pleasure and pain, then
non-human animals have interests. - T
2b. Non-human animals can experience pleasure and pain. - T
3b. Therefore, non-human animals have interests. - T
4b. If non-human animals have interests, then non-human animals
are welfare subjects. - F
5b. Therefore, non-human animals are welfare subjects. - F
6b. If non-human animals are welfare subjects, then non-human
animals are due moral consideration. - T
7b. Therefore, non-human animals are due moral consideration. - F
This position does not involve the implausible claim that non-human
animals can’t feel pleasure and pain. Nor does it reject the
conditional in premise 6b, which affirms that being a welfare subject
is the relevant characteristic for moral considerability. But it does
allow one to reject the inconsistency charge. If the satisfaction of our
desires is sufficient for being a welfare subject, as stated in premise
1d, and the good-for relation is a single relation that holds across
relata, as the formality requirement maintains, then the fact that non
-human animals have interests is not directly relevant to whether
they have a welfare, because interest satisfaction is not a constituent
of welfare on this view. And if one rejects the generality requirement,
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which says that an adequate theory of welfare should reflect the scope
of our welfare language, then the fact that non-human animals turn
out not to be welfare subjects on this view is not a deficiency for one’s
theory of welfare. Rejecting generality, while affirming that welfare is
unitary, allows one to defend a single constitutive account of welfare
that is not applicable to non-human animals. This might be an
implausible view of welfare, but implausibility is not inconsistency. A
desire-satisfaction theory of welfare, where welfare is unitary but not
general, allows one to consistently affirm the moral considerability of
humans while denying equal moral consideration to non-human
animals.
Solution #2: Deny that Welfare is a Unitary Concept
Avoiding Singer’s inconsistency charge by adopting a unitary,
desire-satisfaction theory of welfare while rejecting the generality
requirement, though effective, might seem somewhat disingenuous.
After all, Singer’s point is properly that if one accepts that having
interests is sufficient for being a welfare subject, thereby granting
moral considerability to any being with interests, it would then be
inconsistent not to grant moral considerability to non-human
animals. The first proposed solution relies heavily on the rejection
interest-satifaction as a constituent of welfare. But suppose one were
to accept that interest-satisfaction is a constituent of welfare in the
human case. Also, suppose one were to affirm the generality
requirement, maintaining that a theory of welfare must reflect our
ordinary welfare talk and capture the core class of welfare subjects
within its scope. Finally, suppose that one denies the unity of
welfare. This opens up the possibility of multiple, distinct accounts of
welfare, where the constituents of welfare are not the same.
This position might seem immediately attractive, since it
recognizes that an adequate theory of welfare minimally ought to
reflect the least controversial ways that we use welfare language while
allowing that the constituents of welfare might be dependent on the
type of welfare subject. This view also captures the common sense
proposal that human well-being is importantly connected to interest-
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satisfaction. However, it doesn’t establish the inconsistency that
Singer’s argument is dependent on. This is demonstrated by the two
arguments below.
1a. If humans can experience pleasure and pain, then humans have
interests. - T
2a. Humans can experience pleasure and pain. - T
3a. Therefore, humans have interests. - T
4a. If humans have interests, then humans are welfare subjects. - T
5a. Therefore, humans are welfare subjects. - T
6a. If humans are welfare subjects, then humans are due moral
consideration. - T
7a. Therefore humans are due moral consideration. - T

1b. If non-human animals can experience pleasure and pain, then
non-human animals have interests. - T
2b. Non-human animals can experience pleasure and pain. - T
3b. Therefore, non-human animals have interests. - T
4b. If non-human animals have interests, then non-human animals
are welfare subjects. - ?
5b. Therefore, non-human animals are welfare subjects. - ?
6b. If non-human animals are welfare subjects, then non-human
animals are due moral consideration. - T
7b. Therefore, non-human animals are due moral consideration. - ?
Again, the implausible claim that non-human animals can’t feel
pleasure and pain is avoided, and the conditional in 6b is affirmed.
But if one rejects that welfare is a unitary concept, the fact that
interest-satisfaction is constitutive of human welfare doesn’t tell you
anything about non-human animal welfare. By denying the unity of
welfare, it is an open question whether “welfare” means the same
thing for both humans and non-human animals. If one rejects the
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unity of welfare, one must be prepared to defend a separate account
of the good-for relation for each type of welfare subject. It might
even turn out that interest-satisfaction is constitutive of welfare for
both humans and non-human animals. The point is just that one
cannot infer this from the fact that interest-satisfaction is a
constituent of human welfare unless one maintains that welfare is a
unitary concept. If welfare is not unitary, the soundness of the first
argument leaves premise 4b, and thus 5b and 7b, with indeterminate
truth-values. It is not inconsistent to accept the first argument but
fail to affirm the conclusion of the second in this case, because
whether this conclusion is true or false depends on what account of
non-human animal welfare turns out to be true. Without the
requirement that welfare is a unitary concept, this question remains
open.
One might think that the generality requirement resolves this
concern. After all, the generality requirement says that a theory of
welfare must capture the core class of welfare subjects within its
scope, and surely humans and most non-human animals fall equally
into this category. But the generality requirement does not entail the
unity of welfare. One might hold an interest-satisfaction theory of
welfare for humans and a natural-living-based theory of welfare for
non-human animals, with additional accounts of welfare included as
needed to capture the core class of welfare subjects. One’s theory of
welfare would then effectively be a disjunction of several distinct,
subject-specific accounts of the good-for relation. The generality of
welfare requires only that one’s theory of welfare capture the core
class of welfare subjects; it does not require that one posit a single
good-for relation in order to accomplish this task. Even if one
accepts an interest-satisfaction theory of welfare for humans, along
with the generality requirement, if one rejects that welfare is unitary,
there is no inconsistency in affirming the moral considerability of
humans while failing to grant equal moral consideration to nonhuman animals. One can simply remain agnostic about whether nonhuman animals are morally considerable, and one’s theoretical
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commitments about welfare explain why such agnosticism is
appropriate.

Conclusion
Sumner’s proposed constraints on a theory of welfare are
significant because they make our ordinary linguistic practices a kind
of litmus test for the theoretical accuracy of proposed accounts of well
-being. There is ample reason to welcome this proposal. Human well
-being concerns how our lives are going for us, from our own point of
view, and one might think that what we have to say about the matter
is therefore highly relevant. Sumner’s constraints also capture some
of our more compelling intuitions about welfare: that the good-for
relation is one type of relation, and that things can be genuinely good
for a wide range of distinct types of subjects. Sumner’s proposed
constraints have the attractive features of linguistic compatibility and
intuitive plausibility.
This paper has sought to show that there are other reasons to
think Sumner’s proposed constraints on a theory of welfare are
significant, and worth further attention. Utilitarian arguments like
that of Peter Singer continue to be some of the more compelling
arguments for the equal moral considerability of non-human
animals. These arguments unquestionably rely on both the generality
and formality requirements for their success. If one rejects the
generality of welfare, one can avoid the alleged inconsistency of
denying the moral considerability of non-human animals while
affirming it for humans by simply adopting a theory of welfare that
does not capture non-human animals within its scope. If one rejects
that welfare is unitary, one can accept Singer’s argument that the
moral considerability of humans ultimately depends on the fact that
they have interests that can be satisfied or thwarted , but remain
agnostic about whether non-human animals are morally
considerable. This also avoids the alleged inconsistency. Utilitarian
arguments for the moral considerability of non-human animals are
thus importantly dependent on the unity of welfare and the generality
requirement. If utilitarian arguments of this sort are to have a future,
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these constraints on a theory of welfare must be given more support
than they have received thus far.
In closing, none of what has been said here demonstrates that
utilitarian arguments like Singer’s cannot succeed. It might be that
welfare is a unitary concept, and that the generality requirement is a
perfectly reasonable constraint on one’s theory of welfare. But such
constraints are not vindicated by their intuitive plausibility or their
theoretical usefulness. Questions about the unity and generality of
welfare thus remain significant areas for further research on welfare
in general, and animal welfare in particular.
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